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For a vibrant and viable psychology of social change it is necessary to examine its place and contribution to
the societal processes it seeks to understand, explain, and (potentially) affect. In this article, we first consider
the impact that research and theorizing on social change (should) have and related issues of how we commu-
nicate about our work (and to whom) and dilemmas around researchers being active participants in the change
process. Second, we consider emerging trends in the field and comment on meta-theoretical and “meta-
methodological” issues in going forward, including the interaction between individual and society, having
theoretical models of the person that allow us to account for such an interaction, as well as rethinking our
methodology and ways of “doing” psychology to better reflect people’s experiences of mobilization and
participation. In line with the proposed rethinking of our theories and methods, the final section introduces a
new paradigm for investigating the nexus of social change and leadership dynamics. The overall aim of the
article is to reflect on key questions and dilemmas facing the field and provide some starting points for debating
and shaping its future.
KEY WORDS: social change, social identity, power, leadership, social movements, influence, mobilization
Nowhere else in political and social psychology is engagement with the outside world more
pertinent than for the study of social change, and nowhere else is it as central to examine whether
what we do and how we do it enables or impedes such engagement. In considering the future of
political psychology—and focusing in particular on the psychology of social change—two distinct
and interrelated questions emerge. The first question is about the intersection of what we do as
researchers and the “outside world” that we seek to understand and explain. What is the nature and
extent of our impact and engagement with the world in which social change takes place? How do we
disseminate and communicate about our work and who is our audience? Should we be active
participants in social change processes—and can such engagement be avoided given what we “do”?
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The second question is related to the first and might at first glance seem more inward looking.
It concerns the nature of our theories and methods that for many define their work and the extent to
which they are attuned to the processes that we are seeking to understand and explain. Whether or
not the theories and methods correspond with the social reality of what we study also has implica-
tions for engagement with the broader community.
In this article, we start by raising questions about the impact that research and theorizing on
social change in our view should have. We also raise related issues of how we communicate about
our work and to whom. As part of this discussion, we consider a familiar dilemma between actively
participating in the change process versus “merely” seeking to better understand its psychological
aspects. Second, we take stock of the emerging trends in the field and comment on core meta-
theoretical and “meta-methodological” issues in going forward. The final section focuses on the
intersection between the dynamics of social change and leadership as a paradigmatic shift towards
understanding both agency and mobilization in social change contexts.
The article is not meant to be a detailed review of the field (for recent reviews of this kind see,
for example, Haslam & Reicher, in press; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Thomas, McGarty, &
Mavor, 2009a, 2009b; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). The aim here is to reflect on key
questions and dilemmas facing the field and provide some starting points for a vibrant debate about
its future. Before doing so, and given the complex nature of the “social change” concept, it is
worthwhile clarifying what aspect of social change is in focus here.
That we live in a constantly changing world is to state the obvious. Rapid technological
advances have radically changed many aspects of human life, particularly in the global context, and
brought about drastic changes in economic, political, and social relations. Viewed in this way, social
change may seem almost a by-product of our pursuit of other goals and interests—to borrow from
John Lennon, it is something that happens while we are busy making other plans.
Yet social change is also actively sought through collective mobilization and action. It takes
place as a result of human agency and intention to affect a given social environment based on the
view that existing social conditions or relations are untenable. Over the last few decades such
mobilizations have shaken the world time and again. Regimes (in the Soviet Union, in Southern
Africa, in Southern Europe) that we once thought we would never live to see the end of have
crumbled to dust. Even as we write, the Arab world is in convulsions and the changes that began in
Tunisia and Egypt seem unlikely to end there. The illusion of solidity (immutability) and continuity
and endless social reproduction is not an empirical fact. It is rather one of the props that those in
power use to maintain their dominance. As academics, then, it is all the more important that we don’t
fall prey to this illusion ourselves. Any approach which seeks to ignore change—either conceptually
or practically—will necessarily be deficient.
Of course, there are a number of ways of orienting to the issue of change. One is to consider how
people respond to extant and ongoing social change (e.g., de la Sablonnière, Tougas, & Lortie-
Lussier, 2009). Our focus here, however, is on the emergence of social change through collective
mobilization and action—in particular, how such mobilization is achieved through a psychological
redefinition of who “we” are and who “we” want to be.
The Psychology of Social Change and the World: Impact, Engagement,
Communication, Participation
There are ongoing debates in political and social psychology—and social change research in
particular—about the impact that our work has, or should have, beyond the discipline. There are
frustrations both with how little influence our work seems to have but also about the misinterpreta-
tion and misuse of our findings. These are contradicting views—we either have no impact and thus
abuse is not an issue, or we do have an impact and then abuse is an issue. Whether or not we believe
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that psychology is having an impact, we want to have impact. Not every psychologist is both a
scholar and an activist, but nobody wants to do research that is useless, pointless, and irrelevant. If
nothing more noble motivates us, the bottom line is that research that does not speak to issues that
concern society will remain largely unfunded.
Through not engaging effectively with others inside and outside our field, a space is created for
other disciplines and ideas to do so. Our influence and our very presence are thereby likely to wane.
What is more, if we don’t go out and actively engage with others, some of them may seek us out and
make use of our research. But those who have the resources and the time to seek out our books and
reports and articles are likely to be the more monied, more established, and more powerful. By
default our lack of proactive engagement actually means that the impact and the benefit of our work
will be for the haves and not the have-nots.
In many ways, then, we don’t have much of an option as to whether to have impact. Rather, the
questions facing us are who we have impact upon and whether we have the kind of impact that we
envisaged or hoped for. It therefore makes sense to harness whatever impact we may be having on
the world—whether through scholarship, activism or both—and give it purpose and direction.
One concern should be how and to what extent we should communicate to “outside” audiences
and who these audiences may be. Also, it is often debated whether or not we, as psychologists, have
a responsibility not only to disseminate our work, but to be a part of change processes and active
participants in achieving the kind of society that we believe in. Is direct engagement in social change
processes (e.g., through activism) antithetical to scientific integrity or does it facilitate and enrich
scholarship? Through the knowledge that such real-world involvement brings, perhaps there is
readiness to question the extent to which our theories and methods are attuned to the social reality
of group life—and therefore inherently relevant, veridical, and capable of impact or not.
Three interrelated ways of having “impact,” then, seem prominent: (a) communicating our ideas
in a way that resonates beyond the discipline to maximize the extent to which the relevant theories
and findings are available to and being used by those with practical intentions (e.g., activists,
politicians, policy makers), (b) impact through direct engagement with social and political activism
to “be the change” we want to see in the world (e.g., joining a protest group or social movement), and
(c) the more basic objective of better understanding the psychological aspects of social change. The
third point acknowledges that “impact” as agents of change through direct engagement may not be
the objective of all social change scholars. Indeed, striving to understand the process of change better
is a worthwhile objective in itself provided that the theories and models that guide such an inquiry
speak to the reality of social and political processes involved in social change. The focus in this
section is on “impact” through communication, engagement, and participation and associated dilem-
mas, while the third point is discussed in detail in the sections to follow.
First, then, is it worthwhile asking what are we doing to disseminate what we have learned to
those who use or should use our knowledge? How can we better communicate and engage with
different audiences (e.g., policy makers, activists, oppressed or disadvantaged groups), and what are
some of the obstacles to such engagement? Communication per se is important as even the best ideas
communicated poorly will be of little use to those beyond our discipline. Equally, however, the most
relevant, veridical, clearly communicated, and applicable insights will be ignored, questioned, and
opposed depending on how they are seen to “fit” particular political objectives and agendas. It may
therefore be worthwhile to be mindful of the politics inherent in what we do and the power relations
that our practices challenge or perpetuate.
A related question concerns the nature of “audiences” that our discipline can or should engage
with. Who are the intended or unintended “end-users” for our research and ideas? Are they policy
makers or politicians? Activists or disadvantaged and oppressed minorities of some form? Should
those driving social change or countering such change (e.g., political apparatchiks, activist groups,
journalists) have a greater presence in political psychology forums such as conferences and this
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journal? One argument is that in addition to other academics, we as psychologists have a responsi-
bility to communicate with politicians and policy makers whose decisions impact on all our lives and
also to enable those with limited resources and access to “strategic advice” to mobilize widespread
support for their cause.
Orienting our research to the more applied policy domain—including partnerships with relevant
policy bodies to examine a particular research space (e.g., how to enhance tolerance and social
cohesion in a multicultural society)—forces a reexamination of the usefulness of our ideas to
“outside” audiences. As such, it is one useful tool for sharpening the theoretical and empirical
messages to resonate with those who are interested in the ideas and their application, but unfamiliar
with the nuanced and jargon-laden debates that often fuel social change research in the first place.
Crossing the policy divide has served other fields well (e.g., behavioral economics), increasing their
worth in the minds of policy makers and funding bodies. Beyond the benefits to the discipline,
though, this approach makes it more likely that policy makers tasked with addressing social problems
that are also core topics in political psychology (e.g., intergroup conflict, racism and other forms of
prejudice, disadvantage, discrimination, and injustice) are armed with the strongest advice and
evidence available (e.g., having both economic and group-based strategies at their disposal to affect
change in attitudes and behaviors that concern society). Successfully translating the relatively
abstract ideas into the field takes patience, ingenuity, and creativity. But it also produces work that
is alive with meaning and relevance beyond our leafy campuses and lavish conference venues (e.g.,
Paluck, 2009).
But engagement is not a one way street. It is not just about teaching. It is also worthwhile
considering what psychology can learn from those who directly experience or participate in pro-
cesses that we study and theorize about. It is through such engagement—an ongoing dialogue with
people in the “field” who should be able to understand and in some ways apply our ideas—that the
ideas and approaches themselves may be refined and resonate better with a range of audiences. From
the perspective of community social psychology and liberation psychology (e.g., Montero, 2005,
2009), for example, the distinction between the researcher and those oppressed by particular social
structures and processes is redefined so that both are agents of change. Within this perspective, the
psychologist is an external agent of social change who is working together with those directly
affected by disadvantage or injustice as internal agents to problematize, denaturalize, and ultimately
challenge oppression (Montero, 2000, 2009). Lewin (1946) also argued that a central function of
intergroup relations research is to lead to action and that “Research that produces nothing but books
will not suffice” (p. 35). Inspired by Lewin’s notion of action research, participatory action research
involves a dialogue between internal and external agents through which consciousness is mobilized
towards change, with the recognition that the main ground for action is each person’s thoughts
(Montero, 2009).
There are significant structural obstacles to such engagement, however, that concern what “we”
as a discipline value and consider as evidence of worthwhile research and theorizing. In many
countries, academic status (or even survival) depends upon assessment processes where the gold
standard is publication in high impact journals and little else counts for much. Even where this is
not the case, there are strong cultural norms which endorse these standards (see Cialdini, 2009) and
which view communication to nonacademic audiences as something less important or even—
especially where one communicates through the media—as a betrayal of our values and a form of
“dumbing down.” If academics are to spend more time on engaging with these broader audiences it
is important to challenge these structures and these values.
It is important, then, to stress not only the social value of engagement but also its intellectual
value. Indeed, arguably the greatest intellectual achievement is not to publish in arcane disciplinary
journals read by people who share our perspectives and our assumptions. It is to develop our ideas
to the point where they are clear enough, systematic enough, and meaningful enough to engage and
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persuade those members of the general public who share our curiosity about the nature of the social
and political world. Perhaps the greatest accolade is not to be a keynote at an international conference
but to enthral a class of school students. It is certainly the more challenging task.
It is all very well to make these points, however, and the more established scholars may well
have accumulated the credit which allows them to deviate somewhat from established norms without
endangering themselves (Hollander, 1958)—or changing the norms. Things are very different for
those in their early careers for whom deviation (and any reduction in their number of high-impact
journal articles) may result in failure to get a job, failure to get tenure and hence failure to have an
academic career. It is therefore the responsibility of those who are more senior as much as (if not
more than) those who are more junior to address what sort of work gets in our journals, what sort of
contribution secures the prizes of our associations, and what we value in our academic worlds.
The stakes are high if we take the view that political psychology is weaker if the very work we
should be doing to make our contribution “alive in the world” is inconsistent with the structures of
the discipline itself. But it is equally important to acknowledge that there are large risks associated
with becoming involved in real-world issues. Most obviously, we risk losing our credibility, our
authority, and even our funding if we come to be (or be seen as) politically partisan (Pettigrew, 2008).
One simple retort, which we have intimated already, is that we are always inescapably political.
That failing to make an explicit choice is making an implicit choice for the status quo since we are
established, funded, and maintained by existing social structures, and it is the existing order which
accesses and uses our work. So the issue isn’t whether we are political or not, but whether we want
to make our politics explicit. Equally, let us not overdo the costs of activism. There are clearly areas
where involvement would go with the grain of mainstream principles (and hence not provoke their
resistance) even if there is a striking failure to implement those principles (and hence activism is
necessary). An obvious example has to do with racial injustice (Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Sears, Van
Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997).
As Pettigrew (2008, p. 80) argues, partisan does not equal bias and being unscientific—if we are
passionate about such injustices, we should want to understand their true character, as effective
remedies require an accurate understanding of the problem. Indeed, it is possible for scholarship to
be facilitated and enriched by activism. Engagement with those in the “field” may provide both
opportunities for application but also a more nuanced and contextualized insight into the social
change process, in turn enriching our theoretical and empirical efforts. Altogether, engagement in
this area serves to elevate the profile and the standing of our discipline.
Even in the absence of direct political engagement on the part of researchers, though, efforts to
understand social change have political implications through our theories and methods. One question
that we consider below is whether our theories and methods themselves enable (or prevent) us to
“do” research that is relevant and potentially engaging in the first place. So, having considered the
issues of communicating effectively with a range of audiences and engaging with social change
processes in a more direct manner, a more fundamental question concerns the very theories and
methods that currently inform the psychology of social change.
The Psychology of Social Change of the Future: What It Takes and Do We Have It?
If we are to have a productive dialogue with practitioners (policy makers, activists, etc.) we need
a shared understanding and conceptual clarity about what social change entails psychologically. With
consensus about the possibility and the process of change comes the possibility of developing new
insights about why and when change happens—and also why and when it does not. Within social and
political psychology, social change—and in particular collective mobilization for change—has been
one of the most vibrant areas of inquiry. It is worthwhile discussing briefly where the field is at right
now before making suggestions for possible future directions. There are already extensive and recent
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reviews of the social change research and theorizing (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2008, 2009;
Haslam & Reicher, in press; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Thomas et al., 2009a, 2009b; van
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus,
2008; Wright, 2009). For current purposes we will simply point out some broad and promising
directions that have emerged within the field to help orient the discussion of its future.
One consistent finding has been that social identity processes are central to social change both
when it comes to collective mobilization and collective action (see van Zomeren et al., 2008 for a
recent meta-analysis; see also Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2009 for an analysis of the social identity
theory as a model of social power and social change), but also other forms of change in intergroup
relations such as enhancing social harmony and prejudice reduction (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2008;
Wenzel et al., 2008). In addition, it is becoming clear that these minority- and majority-oriented
(respectively) aspects of social change need to be considered together (e.g., Subašić et al., 2008); for
example, as efforts to reduce prejudice and enhance tolerance between groups also tend to thwart
willingness to challenge inequality and injustice on the part of vulnerable groups who are disadvan-
taged by the status quo (e.g., ethnic minorities; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). There has also been a
growing recognition of the role of group-based emotions and efficacy in collective behavior oriented
towards social change and novel theoretical models have emerged to highlight the intersection of
identity, emotion, efficacy, and collective action (Thomas et al., 2009a, 2009b; van Zomeren et al.,
2008).
Within community social psychology (and Latin American liberation psychology in particular),
a related trajectory of ideas is being developed centred on the concept of relatedness. Building on
Freire’s (1970) work, these researchers start from the premise that it is through dialogue and
emerging relationships with others that consciousness can be mobilized for action. Through this
process, people start to question and criticize the conditions of injustice and oppression hitherto
considered “normal” and legitimate. Akin to the idea of “cognitive alternatives” as precursors of
social change (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), this work also argues that when critical consciousness is
mobilized, people move away from the uncritically accepted version of “reality” towards considering
the possibility of transforming their lives (Montero, 2009).
While these are important developments, it is important to recognize that they cannot simply be
grafted on to our discipline as simply another of the many topics that we study. Rather, it is important
to recognize that they have important theoretical and methodological implications for the way in
which we do our business in general.
The first, and core, issue has to do with the way in which we conceptualize our object of study.
The critical point is to recognize that, while the object of our study is individual behavior, the level
upon which we seek to explain that behavior necessarily involves organizational, structural, and
ideological factors. Our task is to understand how the psychological field of the individual is
structured by the social (Lewin, 1947) and how, as a consequence, the actions of individuals
constitute (and reconstitute) society. It follows that we can never explain social phenomena by
looking at individual psychology in a vacuum (see Tajfel & Israel, 1972). Rather we must always ask
how psychological processes are constituted through and operate in social context. In the words of
Turner and Oakes (1986), our field is concerned with the psychological aspects of society.
More than this, though, an ability to explain social change (or even to account for the possibility
of social change) depends upon an analysis of the relationship between the individual and the social
context which does not assume the primacy of either. What we do is evidently shaped by social
norms, by institutional possibilities and institutional constraints. But equally, we can act—act
together that is—to alter norms, institutions, and even whole social systems.
Rather than a sum of independent if coexisting individuals, social structures and processes are
a product of the individual mind and the social world epitomizing each other. The psychology of
social change studies individual cognition, emotions, and behavior, but also how people collectively
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create and solve the problems of society. Nowhere is the interaction between an individual and
society more ubiquitous than in the area of social continuity and change. Equally, nothing reminds
us more clearly of the need for an interactionist meta-theory of the human subject than the study of
social change.
The second issue flows directly on from this. Clearly, change is not ubiquitous. Most of us live
in stable social systems which endure our whole life long. It is certainly important to study this
stability and to pay as much attention to how continuity is achieved as how change comes about.
What we must not do, however, is begin to take continuity for granted, to essentialize and eternalize
it and thereby to rule out the very possibility of change.
At a general level, this viewpoint seems to be gaining ground. Over the last 30 or so years there
has been a slow revolution in the scientific model of the person. This revolution has occurred in
psychology but also related fields of neuroscience and biology (e.g., epigenetics) and has direct
implications for the question of whether political psychology can help address major global chal-
lenges. Put simply, biological and psychological systems that for a long time were deemed to be
stable, static, and “set in plaster” at an early age are being found to be more malleable. Furthermore,
there is greater recognition that a person’s immediate social context and the way it is subjectively
understood has an important role in explaining physiological, cognitive, and behavioral responses
(e.g., self-categorization-in-context, situated cognition; for a review see Reynolds et al., 2010)
Such evidence of malleability emerging from multiple domains challenges “us” in political
psychology to reflect on how theory and research in this field address the issues of continuity and
change. For example, many would agree that responding to global challenges requires social
mobilization and collective action, as well as widespread change to people’s ideas, theories, ide-
ologies, attitudes, and practices. Here, however, is the catch. At a more specific level, often these
same people endorse theoretical models of social and psychological functioning that not only
do not focus on such processes of “change” but do not allow for change full stop (Turner &
Reynolds, 2003).
To reiterate (for the point is critical): if as a field we accept that social change is possible, then
our models must not naturalize and embed social stability at the expense of social change and vice
versa. We have discussed elsewhere the usefulness or otherwise of stability-oriented approaches as
explanations of social change (see Subašić et al., 2008; Turner & Reynolds, 2003) and will only
summarize the argument here. Briefly, locating the basic causes of social stability and dominant-
subordinate relations in an asocial way at the level of evolution, genes, and personality, for example,
ignores contemporary intergroup forces that shape psychology and behavior and produce change
(e.g., identification, participation, radicalization, mobilization). It is very different to analyze the
ways in which dominant groups produce social stability by the development of legitimating and
justifying belief systems (part of which may indeed be the idea that human nature precludes change).
Viewing stability as a product of evolutionary drives is in contrast to placing the explanatory
emphasis on the strategies used by dominant groups to create legitimacy and naturalize a social order
that is advantageous to them. The latter opens the way to understanding how these systems can be
undermined and hence change can be brought about.
The social identity perspective in social psychology (in which we incorporate social identity
theory and self-categorization theory) is focused on explaining power, the emergence of (il)legiti-
macy, and social change. This perspective tells us, first, that we often define ourselves as members
of a social category (I am a woman, a liberal, a catholic, a football fan, etc.), that our perspectives,
understandings, and actions are shaped by the groups in terms of which we define ourselves (for
recent reviews see Haslam, Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, 2010a, 2010b; Klandermans,
Sabucedo, & Rodriguez, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2010; Turner & Reynolds, 2010) and that acting
together as group members empowers us to impose our perspectives even against the resistance of
others (Haslam & Reicher, 2011; Reicher & Haslam, in press).
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A key implication of this perspecive, then, is that social change is bound up with a psychological
change in our sense of who “we” are—a change from thinking of ourselves individually to thinking
of ourselves collectively, but also a change in our understanding of the group’s position. It is when
we think this position to be illegitimate and we consider a better position to be achievable (through
the availability of cognitive alternatives and perceptions of instability) that changes in the reality of
social relations become possible.
The third issue, though, is that it is hard to envisage how psychology can contribute to
understanding how people “make their world anew” as long as we continue to treat human beings
as perceivers rather than doers, as passive rather than active, as observers rather than makers of the
world. Perhaps we have a tendency to view people as passive because of the ways in which they
are rendered passive in our research. Consider the prototypical psychology study. Individuals will
be brought to a laboratory where they are presented with carefully designed stimuli and asked to
respond, most usually by a tick on a piece of paper or a key press on a computer keyboard. It is
a strangely silent and isolated world. People are not allowed to talk to each other for fear of
compromising the independence of their data for statistical analysis. Less and less are they
allowed to interact with each other (Haslam & McGarty, 2001), and there is less attention to
behavior (Moreland, Fetterman, Flagg, & Swanenburg, 2010). They certainly are not allowed to
challenge the terms of the study itself or question the ways in which response measures are
framed. If they do try, theirs will be treated as missing data and they will be written from the
history of the study.
So all in all, people can only gaze and comment upon a world made by others. It is a world they
played no part in making and which they certainly cannot make anew. And this enforced passivity is
then reflected in theoretical models which treat human beings as perceivers and which treat human
understanding as a matter of how we deploy our internal cognitive resources to make sense of a world
which preexists “out there.”
How different this is to what happens outside the laboratory in the world of social and
political practices. Take, for instance, one of the issues that is central to social psychology and to
politics: the inequalities and hostilities and conflicts between different groups. In a globalizing
world, this is increasingly expressed through encounters between settled populations and
migrants—especially those of different ethnic backgrounds. To suggest that people respond
through a process of quiet and lonely contemplation would be quite bizarre. The reality is that
wherever we go we are assailed by different voices telling us about what is happening and what
it means and how we should respond. Headlines scream at us from the papers telling us that
immigrants are swamping us. Politicians declaim to us from our televisions and radios, activists
shout at us from street corners, fellow employees debate with us in the workplace. The process of
sense making and responding is loud and it is communal. What we do depends upon what com-
munity prevails: how we define our selves and our self-interest and hence which of the many
voices speaks to us because it speaks for us.
The study of racism provides a case example of these points. In more prosaic terms, racism is
not a process of perception; it is a process of mobilization (Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Haslam, & Rath,
2008). By creating and vilifying a “them,” racism also creates and mobilizes particular meanings and
expressions of who “we” are and who “we” want to be. It is not only a matter of what sort of world
we see but of what sort of world we want to make. It is not a cognition of the present but a
future-oriented practice. And what is true of racism is true of almost any issue on which we take a
position: certainly our party political positions, our approach to environmental issues, our economic
preferences. . . . The paradigm through which we need to address human social understanding is one
of mobilization rather than of perception.
The Political Solidarity Model recently employed this paradigm to provide a novel analysis of
social change (Subašić et al., 2008). It draws attention to social influence relations between those
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currently in positions of authority or leadership (e.g., the dominant group), those “power minorities”1
seeking to challenge authority and gain influence (e.g., a subordinate group), and the “silent
majority” as the audience being mobilized (e.g., third parties). This work demonstrates how authori-
ties and power minorities are involved in the task of mobilizing the majority—the one in support of
social stability, the other in support of social change. It illustrates how stability and change are
interdependent processes so that as a movement for change gains momentum, the status quo is more
difficult to maintain. It also shows how there is an asymmetry between the two, such that existing
authorities have “incumbency benefits” (not least, greater control over the means of communication)
that can make it difficult to hear alternative voices for change (Subašić et al., 2008).
But perhaps what is most important about a mobilization approach and the Political Solidarity
Model in particular is that it recognizes that the transformations in self-understanding which are so
essential to the change process depend upon the ways in which people select between different
influence sources. Change, that is, is dependent upon identity, which, in turn depends upon who we
listen to and regard as our leaders. Centrally, though, rejecting those who seek to maintain the status
quo in dominant-subordinate relations is not enough for “third party” mobilization—a shared
identity that transforms who “we” are needs to emerge with those vying to lead “us” towards change.
Let us, then, consider these relationships in a little more detail.
Social Change, Social Identity, and Leadership
We have stressed that movements for social change are contingent (a) upon people achieving a
shared identity with shared norms and values, and (b) upon the development of belief systems about
the social world which make change both justifiable and viable. The former is necessary for people
to transcend interpersonal differences, to develop a sense of solidarity, and to act together in a
coordinated and effective way (Subašić et al., 2008). The latter is necessary to ensure that group
members devote their combined efforts towards challenging the status quo and confronting the power
of dominant groups. Thus solidarity and conflict are two sides of the same coin. “We” must act
together in order to overcome “them” (see also Klandermans, van de Toorn, & van Stekelenburg,
2008).
To understand how social change can occur, then, it is necessary to understand how the
necessary collective self-definitions come about. But this still begs the question of what leaders must
do in order to be successful in transforming identities (which is the same as saying what leaders must
do in order to be effective; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005). The social identity analysis of
leadership and power is oriented to precisely this quandary. In this view, others “like us” play an
important role in shaping and potentially changing the psychology of the person—they have influ-
ence over our thoughts, feelings, and actions. When people are considered to be “us” rather than
“them,” there is an expectation that “we” ought to agree and respond in the same way (in reactions,
judgments, attitudes, and behavior; e.g., Turner, 1991). It is through such shared social identity that
others influence “who we are” and “what we do” (e.g., Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Turner,
2005; Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner, Reynolds, & Subašić, 2008).
Being able to shape and create shared understandings of “who we are” and “what we do” (and
to do so better than others) both defines leadership success and provides an analysis of power
(Turner, 2005). The foundation of power is getting others to carry out one’s will, and it rests on group
identity and the influence processes which flow from it. In this model, the traditional understanding
of power as the ability to bring about compliance through one’s capacities to provide positive and
negative outcomes (i.e., coercion) is argued to be the weakest form of power. It reveals a lack of
1 We use the term “power minority” here in line with Tajfel (1978) to signify that the numerical dimension is less central to
the “minority” experience, so that numerical majorities can also be “power” minorities.
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genuine ability to influence through group identity and serves to reinforce a sense of “us” and
“them,” weakening opportunities for real power to emerge in the future (e.g., Subašić, Reynolds,
Turner, Veenstra, & Haslam, 2011).
Leaders, then, will be effective to the extent that they are able to represent themselves as “one
of us”—through aligning their own biographies with the defining features of the group, by stressing
the compatibility of their own values and beliefs with those of the group, by locating their own
aspirations in the aspirations of the group. But important as this is, it is but one of several identity-
based criteria against which a leader will be judged (see Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011).
Leaders additionally need to be seen to “act for us”—that is, their actions must be seen to be for
the group interest rather than for either themselves, for a particular section of the ingroup, or (still
worse) for the outgroup. This, perhaps, is why the Roman emperor Cinncinatus is still held up as a
model leader (and had a city named after him): Cinncinatus had no desire for power or glory; he left
his farm to save Rome and once he had served his people, happily went back to rural obscurity.
Leaders also need to “craft a sense of us”—that is, they must not only define themselves in order
to fit an existing definition of the group. They can also work on the definition of the group identity
in order to make themselves and their policies central to the realization of group aspirations. In
Scotland, say, the recently victorious Scottish National Party defined Scots as a proud and indepen-
dent people humbled by dependence on England in the United Kingdom and needing independence
to recover the glory of their true nature (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
Finally, leaders need to “make us matter.” They must turn aspirations to realities and demon-
strate their visions to be viable. The emphasis again, is not simply on being or on representing but
also on doing. Identities are not just beliefs, they are visions of how the world should be organized—
and an identity which cannot be realized is simply useless.
At the intersection of leadership and social change, the same audience will be exposed to
multiple would-be leaders all trying to define their identities in different ways. As a number of
authors have recognized, the standard paradigm of influence and change in our society is not one
where a single source is seeking to engage an audience. It is one where different sources are vying
to engage the same audience and, if these sources seem ostensibly to be arguing with each other, they
never have any hope of swaying their rival but merely of recruiting those who listen in (e.g., Mugny,
1982; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008). When Bush
argued with Gore or Obama with McCain, neither believed the other would abandon their party line.
Rather, both were aiming to gain the allegiance of the same electors. The achievement of such
allegiance is the holy grail of politics. It explains why identity is so contested, and why so many
aspirant leaders vie to define our identities.
Not only are there multiple leadership alternatives seeking to convince us of who we are and
what we should do (i.e., seeking to represent, craft, act for, and make “us” matter)—leaders are also
confronted with (or have a role in creating) divided “followerships.” Whether a leader downplays or
emphasizes division between groups—and along which dimensions—has profound implications
both for intergroup relations (e.g., whether there is conflict or cooperation), but also for consolidating
or challenging power relations within a group (Subašić & Reynolds, 2011). Those who want to
challenge a system of dominant and subordinate relations need to redefine intergroup boundaries so
that those seeking to preserve the status quo become “them” rather than “us.” In contrast, those who
want to consolidate authority need to define themselves and the relevant “majority” of followers as
part of a common ingroup (e.g., “we” Americans)—something that is often achieved by creating
and/or excluding a particular outgroup (typically ethnic, racial, or national; Gagnon, 2006; Reicher,
Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2011).
Further, leaders for continuity and the status quo (who are often conservative) generally define
existing dominant-subordinate relations as legitimate or else natural and inevitable (social domi-
nance theory and system justification theory, for example, provide useful insight into these strategies
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for entrenching dominance). In contrast, leaders for change generally seek to mobilize the view that
the status quo is illegitimate and contingent. The two positions are interdependent in the sense that
the success of one construction will serve to undermine the leadership of those advocating the other
(e.g., Subašić et al., 2008; Turner & Reynolds, 2010; Turner et al., 2008). Social change becomes
possible once people start to question whether the status quo is in “our” best interests and whether
those seeking to preserve it share “our” values and goals. Just because people begin to question or
even challenge the status quo, however, it does not mean that change “we can believe in” will be
achieved. Therefore, we need to ask who has the power to shape what values, goals and beliefs define
who “we” are (not) and what “we” do, but also how and why such power changes hands.
In part, this is because collective mobilization is not confined to movements for social change.
The status quo is often (re)actively and just as vigorously defended. Countermobilization, though, is
not the mirror image of mobilization for change. It builds on existing systems of authority and shared
identity between leadership and particular “followerships.” In contrast, mobilization for change
involves not only the severing of such preexisting allegiances, but also the emergence of an
alternative and viable vision for who “we” are—a social identity that simultaneously marginalizes
proponents of the status quo as “them” while aligning the rest of “us” with a change agenda (Subašić
et al., 2008). But, among the different alternatives for change, some will emerge as visionary, while
others will be dismissed as “out of touch” or “too radical” for the kind of future that “we” aspire to.
Taken together, then, in understanding social continuity and change it is important to understand
the emergence of group identity (and sense of “us”) and the maintenance of its ongoing legitimacy
in the eyes of group members. The tension between who has influence and why and whether common
or sectarian interests prevail are central to the perceived legitimacy of a social system and therefore
to the dynamics of social change. It is also necessary to understand how identification with leadership
and the legitimacy of dominant-subordinate relations erodes with the emergence of cognitive alter-
natives and the development of an oppositional stance (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2011; Subašić et al.,
2008; Turner & Reynolds, 2010). Along with such developments, there will be a loss of influence
by the established leaders and authorities and increased identification with those that best capture
the momentum for change (e.g., Subašić, Reynolds, ’t Hart, Reicher, & Haslam, 2009; Turner &
Reynolds, 2010; Turner et al., 2008). One challenge for research and theorizing in this domain is to
explain more precisely which of the many voices for change will capture “our” imagination and why.
Concluding Remarks
The arguments above all speak to central questions of social change as currently understood and
studied within political and social psychology. They also raise questions that concern the field more
broadly. For example, what is the nature and extent of the impact that psychology is having on
“making” the world anew and how such impact can best be harnessed? There are also calls to
reexamine our models of the person and the social world, but also the methods used to study people’s
understandings and actions in the world. New paradigms are proposed that focus on mobilization, the
variable nature of the self and the centrality of leadership and social influence in understanding social
and psychological change.
Three domains emerge from this discussion as possible arenas for further (inter-) disciplinary
discussion, challenge and change. The first concerns how we can communicate more effectively with
a range of audiences beyond the discipline to ensure our work is accessible, engaging and relevant.
Secondly, while there are many real and difficult tensions in becoming involved in social change
movements, it is also worthwhile to consider the possibility that, far from being detrimental to our
scientific judgement, such engagement may enrich and further our insights. Finally, we have a
responsibility to provide robust, scientifically informed theory and research that recognizes both the
reality and possibility of social change and thereby enhances understanding of this process.
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Our article has made a few suggestions for how we move forward and has raised many more
questions. It is not meant to settle matters but rather to open up a vibrant, constructive, and critical
debate as to how we make our discipline and our world anew. To conclude, then, we need a social
and a political psychology that is attuned to how people make their futures. One of our key claims
throughout this article is that abstention on this issue is not an option.
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Turner, J. C., Reynolds, K. J., & Subašić, E. (2008). Identity confers power: The new view of leadership in social psychology.
In J. Uhr & P. ’t Hart (Eds.), Public leadership: Perspectives and practices (pp. 57–72). Canberra: Australian National
University E-Press.
van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2007). Individuals in movements: A social psychology of contention. In B.
Klandermans & C. Roggeband (Eds.), The handbook of social movements across disciplines (pp. 157–204). New York:
Springer.
van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A
quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 134(4), 504–535.
Wenzel, M., Mummendey, A., & Waldzus, S. (2008). Superordinate identities and intergroup conflict: The ingroup projection
model. European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 331–372.
Wright, S. C. (2009). The next generation of collective action research. Journal of Social Issues, 65(4), 859–879.
Wright, S. C., & Lubensky, M. (2009). The struggle for social equality: Collective action versus prejudice reduction. In
S. Demoulin, J. Leyens & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities
(pp. 291–310). New York: Psychology Press.
74 Subašić et al.
